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Building Political Collusion: 
Evidence from Procurement Auctions
* 
 
We investigate the relationship between the time politicians stay in office and the functioning 
of public procurement. To this purpose, we collect a data set on the Italian municipal 
governments and all the procurement auctions they administered between 2000 and 2005. 
Identification is achieved through the introduction of a two-term limit for the mayor in March 
1993: since elections were not coordinated across cities, and previous terms were not 
counted in the limit, mayors appointed right before the reform could be reelected for two 
additional terms, while the others for one only. Our primary finding is that one extra term in 
office deteriorates public spending. In fact, it decreases the number of bidders and, most 
importantly, the winning rebate. Interestingly, we also find that the probability that the same 
firm is awarded more auctions, or that the winning firm is local, increases with time in office. 
These results are compatible with the predictions of a model of favoritism in repeated 
procurement auctions, where time reveals collusive types, thus increasing the value of illegal 
connections at the expense of higher procurement costs. 
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The miss-practice of using procurement contracts to strategically allocate public funds to
interest groups is widespread, and it grants incumbent politicians a powerful tool for con-
solidating their consensus through favoritism, and eventually get bribes. Little is known,
however, about the process that generates political collusion.
We tackle this issue and investigate whether the functioning of public procurement is
aﬀected by the time politicians stay in oﬃce (i.e., the political longevity) using a data set
on the Italian municipal governments and all the procurement auctions for the realization
of public works that they administered between 2000 and 2005. The data set is particularly
suited for the analysis, as it gathers detailed information on the identity of mayors and
contractors over electoral terms, and it ﬁnally allows us to compute the monetary cost of
the time in oﬃce.
For identiﬁcation purposes, we exploit the introduction in March 1993 of a two-term
limit on the mayoral oﬃce. Since elections were not coordinated across cities, and previous
terms were not counted in the term limit, mayors appointed before the reform could
be reelected for two additional terms, while those elected after the reform for one only.
Under the assumption that the election timing could not be manipulated, but it was
the result of an idiosyncratic scheduling, we use the date of election (before or after
March 1993) as an instrument for the time in oﬃce, and analyze the impact on a several
outcomes characterizing the functioning of the procurement auctions. Remarkably, this
quasi-experimental framework also allows us to separate the eﬀect of political longevity
from the eﬀect of the lack of electoral accountability (see Besley and Case, 1995; Ferraz
and Finan, 2010), as mayors elected after the reform faced the term limit when in the
second term, while those elected before the reform faced it when in the third term or
more.
To correct for the simultaneous introduction of another reform that might have af-
fected the composition of the treated and the control group diﬀerently (the change in the
mayor’s electoral rule from party to individual ballot), we implement a fuzzy Regression
Discontinuity Design focusing on elections that were held right before and after March
1993. It is reasonable to assume, in fact, that while the term limit applied sharply to all
the mayors elected after the reform, the eﬀect of individual ballot elections on the selec-
1tion of appointed mayors was instead more resilient, because of the initial diﬃculty for
parties to recruit candidates more suitable to the new electoral system. For this reason,
mayors elected around the reform should be ex-ante otherwise identical in terms of both
observable and unobservable characteristics.
Main results show that one extra term in oﬃce reduces the number of bidders par-
ticipating in the auctions (-21.74% in the 2SLS speciﬁcation) and, more importantly, the
winning rebate (-12.36%). A back of the envelop calculation suggests that an average
public work costs about 8,000 euros more in municipalities with a third term mayor,
as opposed to municipalities with a second term mayor.1 We also ﬁnd that having the
same mayor in power for an additional term increases the probability that the contract is
awarded to a local ﬁrm (+2.78%, although not precisely estimated), or to the same ﬁrm
repeatedly (+26.32%).
Our ﬁndings are compatible with the predictions of a stylized model of favoritism in
procurement auctions (Arozamena and Weinschelbaum, 2009; Burguet and Perry, 2009),
where time reduces the asymmetric information between mayors and bidders (Ghosh and
Ray, 1996). Under the assumption that types (collusive or not) are not immediately ob-
servable, the model predicts that time in oﬃce increases the probability that the mayor
will ﬁnd a collusive bidder, thus increasing the value of preferential relations. This implies
a higher probability that the same ﬁrm is awarded consecutive auctions and, if locals have
lower costs of colluding, also a higher probability that the winner is a local ﬁrm. Under
certain assumptions about the distribution of bidders’ evaluations, the model further pre-
dicts that as mayor’s longevity increases non-colluded bidders bid less aggressively and,
in the presence of entry costs, the number of bidders decreases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we describe the Italian institutional background, and in Section
4 the data. In Section 5, we explain the identiﬁcation strategy, and in Section 6 we
present the main results. In Section 7 we outline the conceptual framework that we use
to rationalize the evidence. We conclude with Section 8.
1This calculation computed using the 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect on the winning rebate, for a public
work with an average starting value of 509,903 euros.
22 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to a recent empirical literature showing that political connec-
tions boost ﬁrms’ performance (Cingano and Pinotti, 2009; Faccio, 2006; Ferguson and
Voth, 2008; Fisman, 2001; Goldman et al., 2009b) and drive the allocation of procurement
contracts (Goldman et al. 2009a; Hyytinen et al., 2009). While focusing on similar collu-
sive behaviors, we highlight the possibility that political connections may grow with time
in oﬃce, as it takes time for politicians and ﬁrms to reveal their collusive intentions.
We also diﬀer from a number of papers studying the relationship between political
stability and corruption. For example, Gamboa-Cavazos et al. (2008) use ﬁrm-level data
for Mexico on extra-oﬃcial payments made to public authorities, to show that corruption
is more intense over long and short political horizons, and less intense over intermediate
ones, because of a combination of “horizon” and “capture” eﬀects. Using cross-country
data, Campante et al. (2008) ﬁnd a similar U-shaped relationship between corruption
and political stability. Despite the similarities, it is important to stress that, while these
papers study the eﬀect of the remaining time in oﬃce (the political horizon) on unlawful
behaviors, we focus instead on the time spent in oﬃce (the political longevity). As it will
become clearer in the next section, our approach has very diﬀerent theoretical arguments,
including the absence of non-linearities. With this respect, we are closer in the spirit
to Besley and Prat (2004), who ﬁnd a positive and linear correlation between political
longevity and some cross-country measures of corruption.
Some authors have emphasized the importance of experience over political careers. For
example, Padr´ o i Miquel and Snyder (2006) ﬁnd that productivity, as measured by survey-
ing legislators, lobbyists, and journalists in North Carolina about the eﬀectiveness of the
members of the House of Representatives, rises sharply with tenure. More recently, Dal B´ o
and Rossi (2008) exploit a natural experiment in the Argentine House of Representatives,
where term lengths (2 or 4 years) were assigned randomly across members of parliament,
to show that longer terms enhance legislative productivity, as measured by attendance,
committee activity, and the number of legislative achievements. Applying the same argu-
ment to the case of procurement auctions, it is easy to think of a new mayor who does
not have any expertise in public procurement and, after election, can only endure previous
practices. However, if really motivated in reducing public spending and gaining electoral
3consensus, he or she might soon learn how to improve the eﬃciency of the procurement
process. Whether there is an eﬀect of political longevity over the functioning of public
procurement remains, therefore, an empirical matter.
Finally, our paper contributes to a recent empirical literature on corruption which
makes use of direct measures of shadow behaviors, like the unlawful administration of
public goods, or the amount of bribes, rather than the more traditional opinion surveys.2
Among the others, Bandiera et al. (2009) study the introduction in Italy of a centralized
purchasing authority (Consip), and ﬁnd that the waste of public funds is mostly generated
by red tape rather than bribes, and that there are sizable cost reductions in centralizing
the purchase of standardized goods because of the higher competition among contractors.
Ferraz and Finan (2010) use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to
construct new measures of political corruption in local governments, and test whether the
term limit rule aﬀects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians.
Compared to this literature, the contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we provide
novel empirical evidence about the relationship between the time politicians stay in oﬃce
and the functioning of the public procurement auctions they administrated. Second, we
rationalize these ﬁndings in a theoretical setting that combines two otherwise separated
strands of the theoretical literature: the one on favoritism in procurement auctions, and
the one on building collusive relationships.
3 The Institutional Background
The Italian municipal administration (Comune) is made of a mayor (Sindaco), who su-
pervises an executive committee (Giunta), and a council (Consiglio Comunale), which en-
dorses the policies proposed by the mayor with majority rule. The functions of a municipal
administration, besides contracting for public works, include the provision of transporta-
tion, some welfare (like assistance to elderly people, nursery schools, and public housing),
and utilities (like water, electricity, and gas). In 1993 the mayoral electoral system was
changed from party to individual ballot, with a majority premium for the winning candi-
date of at least two-thirds of the seats in the council (60% in cities with more than 15,000
2See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for a survey of early studies.
4inhabitants).3 The same reform also introduced a two-term limit for the mayor, which
only applied to the terms elected after the reform.4 In September 2000 the duration of
the legislature was extended from four to ﬁve years, as it was before March 1993.
Municipalities are required to realize public works in outsourcing, and select the con-
tractor through public tenders. Tenders are regulated by the Legge 109/94 (so called
“Legge Merloni”), and several amendments (“Merloni-bis” in 1995, “Merloni-ter” in
1998), which specify all the proceedings of the procurement process.5 The auctions in
our ample are sealed-bid and single-attribute (i.e., the technical component of the oﬀers
plays no role in the assignment, provided that the winner satisﬁes some minimum quality
standards which are set by the contracting authority). Each auction is administered by a
manager, who is directly appointed by the mayor among the bureaucrats of the municipal-
ity.6 The manager supervises the whole procurement process, including the preparation
of the preliminary project, the advertisement and the administration of the auction, the
payments to the winning ﬁrm (upon initial approval by the city council), and monitors
the realization of the work.
Participation can be of three types: the Pubblico incanto, where participation is open
to any ﬁrm satisfying some minimum technical requirements; the Licitazione privata,
which is similar to Pubblico incanto except that it is the contracting authority that invites
to participate all the ﬁrms satisfying some technical requirements; ﬁnally, the Trattativa
privata, where the contracting authority only invites a restricted number of ﬁrms, with
a minimum of 15.7 The choice of a particular participation mechanism depends on the
starting value of the auction, plus some other technical components.8
3The reform was a response to the political crisis that originated on February 1992 from a judicial
investigation (so called “Mani Pulite”) on the corruption of national and local administrators. This
investigation leaded to the dissolution of the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana), which
had ruled the country for over forty years, and to the end of the so called “Prima Repubblica” (First
Republic).
4The term limit only applies to terms lasting for more than two years.
5Other legislative changes were introduced in 2006, but they did not concern our sample (2000-2005).
6In our sample, the manager is replaced 88% of the times that a new mayor is elected, against 33% in
case the mayor is reelected.
7The technical requirements for participation must be certiﬁed by an external private agency. Other
formats include the Licitazione privata sempliﬁcata, which is substantially similar to the Licitazione
privata, and the Appalto concorso, which is only used for works with a high architectural content starting
from 300,000 euros.
8The terms of the procurement contract (the time of the work delivery, and the cost of the work) might
be renegotiated in cases of unforeseen natural events (like storms, earthquakes, landslides, etc.).
5Firms bid the price at which they are willing to do the work, in the form of a percentage
reduction (a rebate) with respect to the auction’s starting value (also called the reserve
price). The starting value is set by an engineer employed in the municipal administration,
following a price-list of the standardized cost for each type of work. Accordingly, it is
plausible to assume that the starting value cannot adjusted to favor, for example, bidders
with a capacity constraint.9
Because of a complex awarding criterion, the highest rebate is not necessarily the
winning rebate. To prevent ﬁrms from over-bidding (that is, bidding a price which does
not allow to recoup works’ expenses) a complex mechanism is implemented (see Figure
1). After a preliminary trimming of the top/bottom 10% of the collected bids, the bids
exceeding the average by more than the average deviation are further excluded, and the
winning bid is the highest among the remaining bids, i.e., the one just below this averaged-
average “anomaly thresholds”.10 The fact that the work is assigned to the bid that is
closest to the anomaly threshold from below is particularly important in our case, because
it guarantees the presence of some competitive pressure. This is not the case, for example,
in other similar auctions, like a pure average bid auction, where the winning bid is the
closest to the average no matter whether from above or from below.11
4 The Data
We use an administrative data set about all the Italian mayoral terms elected between
1985 and 2008, provided by the Italian Ministry of Interiors (Ministero degli Interni). The
data set contains information on the identity, gender, age, highest educational attainment,
political aﬃliation, and previous job of the elected mayor. It also contains information on
the legislature, like the exact duration and the reasons of any eventual early termination,
9Work-safety costs are not subject to rebate.
10As for illustration, consider this simple example. In a hypothetical auction, after the trimming of
the tails there are three participants placing the following bids (in the form of a rebate over the starting
value): 10, 14 and 16. The average bid is thus 13.33. The average diﬀerence of the bids above this average
bid is 1.12. Thus the anomaly thresholds is 14.44. It turns out that in this case the winning bid is 14,
which is above the average, even if 16% is the highest bidden rebate.
11Interestingly, in our data we ﬁnd that there is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation
between the number of bidders and the winning rebate (0.424). The proof of the properties of this
awarding mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion, see Albano et al. (2006) and
Decarolis (2008).
6and the electoral results. Finally, we also have yearly information at municipality level
about the size of the resident population, the total revenues and expenditure, plus some
demographic characteristics as of 2005, like the disposable income per capita, the labor
force participation rate, the number of productive units per capita, the elderly index, the
population density, and the resident population.
We combine this mayoral information with a data set about the procurement auctions
administered by each municipality between 2000 and 2005. This is provided by the Ital-
ian Authority for the Surveillance of Public Procurement (Autorit` a per la Vigilanza sui
Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture, A.V.C.P.), which collects data on all
the public procurement auctions for public works, with starting value greater or equal to
150,000 euros. The data set includes information at auction level about the number of
bidding ﬁrms, the starting value, the identity of the winning bidder, and the typology of
the work. Each procurement auction is ﬁnally matched with the corresponding mayoral
term, according to the date of bids’ delivery.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The initial sample consists of all the cities for which we observe at least one auction
between 2000 and 2005, and without missing information on the most relevant variables
(the number of bidders, the starting value, the winning rebate, the identity of the winning
bidder, plus the time the mayor has been in oﬃce).12 To maximize sample size, we assign
the sample mean (or the mode, if a dummy variable) to other variables with missing
data (namely, the budget deﬁcit, the average income per capita, whether the mayor was
born in the city/province/region, the mayor’s previous job and highest education level,
the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition, and the fraction of seats in the mayor’s
coalition), and include a dummy for missing status for these variables. These procedure
increases our sample size by about 8.5% and allows us to obtain more precise estimates.13
We further excluded cities with less than 500 inhabitants to avoid limiting size eﬀects,
and cities in which there had been an early termination in the past for political reasons,
to avoid endogenous electoral cycles. In Table 1 we present summary statistics for the
12Of the 8,104 existing Italian municipalities, 4,279 had no auctions between 2000 and 2005.
13All the results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to the exclusion of the observations with
any missing data.
7sample of municipalities over which we run the estimation analysis.
The ﬁnal sample is made of 3,825 cities, representatively distributed across the country:
40% located in the North-West of Italy, 20% in the North-East, 14% in the Center, 22%
in the South and only 4% in the Islands. The average municipality is fairly large, with
11,668 inhabitants. Only 8% of the observed mayors (5,219, see Table 2) are women, 52%
were born in the same municipality they run (85% in the same province, 94% in the same
region), and about 52% have a college degree, while 47% have a secondary school degree,
the remaining 1% with an elementary degree only.14 Almost 11% were not employed before
being appointed (either unemployed or out of the labor force), the majority being employed
in high-skilled occupations (77%, including managers, self-employed and entrepreneurs),
followed by medium-skilled (9%, including clerks), and low-skilled (3%, including blue-
collars).
With respect to the political characteristics, 30% of the mayors had been elected with
a center-left party, only 11% with a center-right party, and all the rest with a center-wing,
separatist or unidentiﬁed party (many parties were local). 58% of the mayors are in the
ﬁrst term, 35% in the second term, and only 7% in the third or fourth term, with 39%
facing a term limit. Interestingly, the mayor’s party longevity is slightly lower than the
mayor’s longevity, mostly because some mayors changed party between terms, or because
some parties changed their name and could not be matched between terms. Mayoral
coalitions are fairly homogeneous (1.31 parties) and stable (67.79% of the seats in the
council), as a result of the majority premium awarded to the winning coalition (60% in
cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, 67% in small cities).
Table 3 describes the characteristics of the auctions in the sample, where we excluded
outliers with none or more than 100 bidders. The total number of auctions is 27,537, with
an average number of bidders equal to 21.34, and a winning rebate of 12.97%. In 12% of
the cases the winner was a ﬁrm registered in the same city (52% in the same province,
and 70% in the same region), and on average the highest percentage of auctions within a
term awarded to the same ﬁrm is 24%. In only 9% of the cases the selection criterion was
the private invitation (Trattativa privata), the rest being with open participation (Pubblico
incanto or Licitazione privata). The average size of the public work is relatively small, with
14All mayors’ characteristics computed at the beginning of each observed term.
8an average starting value of 540,000 euros.15 The majority of the public works concern
the construction of roads (23%), then schools (13%), public building (5%), public housing
(1%), and art-related constructions (4%). It is also interesting to note that the number of
auctions per year was constant over the period 2000 and 2004 (between 15% and 20% per
year), although there are fewer auctions in 2005 when the sample was originally collected.
5 Identiﬁcation Strategy
We want to test whether the time a mayor remains in oﬃce can aﬀect the functioning of
the procurement auctions administered in the city. We assume that the outcome of an
auction i, managed by a mayor m, can be speciﬁed in the following linear form:
yim = α + βTim + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + νim, (1)
where yim is the outcome of the auction; Tim denotes the mayor’s longevity in oﬃce at the
time of the bids’ delivery; Xi is a vector of auction characteristics; Xm is a vector of mayor
and city characteristics; and νim represents the disturbance term composed by a mayor
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect ηm and the usual white noise component ǫim. The main coeﬃcient
of interest is β. We perform the analysis at auction level, using for Tim both the exact
longevity at the date of the bids’ delivery and the term in oﬃce.16
In equation (1), we specify Xi and Xm using the following sets of characteristics. To
control for geographical and municipal eﬀects we include: the resident population in the
municipality at the beginning of the term, to proxy for the number of potential competitors
and any other size eﬀect; a full set of dummies for all the 20 Italian regions, to control
for time invariant characteristic at local level; an indicator for the judicial eﬃciency at
year-region level, to control for diﬀerences in the quality of local institutions;17 the budget
percentage deﬁcit over the total revenues, to control for the eﬃciency of the municipal
administration; and a set of indicators for the year of the delivery of the bid, to control
for possible time eﬀects. To address the heterogeneity of the projects, we include: a
15Values reported in 2000 equivalents, using the OECD CPI index.
16We compute cluster adjusted standard errors to allow for a generic mayor-level error component.
17This is computed as the ratio between settled and incoming cases for each regional administrative
court (TAR), and for public works related disputes.
9second order polynomial of the starting value of the auction (i.e., the reservation price
of the contracting authority) in 100 thousands euros and 2000 equivalents; an indicator
of whether the selection mechanism of the auction was with public participation or with
private invitation; and ﬁve object dummies (road, school, building, housing, art). To
control for the characteristics of the mayors, we include: gender; age; four education
dummies; four previous occupation dummies; an indicator for whether the mayor had
been appointed before in any other municipal elective oﬃce; and whether the mayor was
born in the same region. Finally, to control for the electoral characteristics of the mayoral
term, we include: an indicator for whether the mayor faces a term limit; the number of
parties in the mayor’s coalition; the number of majority seats belonging to the mayoral
coalition; two dummies for the mayor’s party (center-left and center-right); the longevity
in power of the mayor’s party, measured in terms; and a dummy for whether the bid
was delivered in the last year before the next scheduled election, to capture electoral
cycles within terms, and address the censoring of terms that starting before 2000 or to be
concluded after 2005.
With respect to yim, the data set contains a large number of outcomes that can help
describing the functioning of the procurement process. We divide these measures in two
sets: the level of competition, and the nature of competition. The level of competition
set includes the number of bidders and the ﬁnal percentage rebate over the reservation
price. The nature of competition set includes an indicator for whether the winning ﬁrm is
registered in the same region of the contracting authority, and the maximum percentage of
adjudications to the same ﬁrm per year (weighted by the number of auctions), the latter
being term invariant.18
5.1 The Electoral Reform: Instrumental Variables
In this section we address the endogeneity of the time in oﬃce (Tim). More colluded
mayors, in fact, might be able to survive longer if the rents produced by collusive behaviors
help them to be reelected. Conversely, colluded mayors might have hard time to get
reelected if voters punish their unlawful behavior in the ballot.
18Since we do not observe all the auctions within a term, but only those between 2000 and 2005, we
could not compute other measures of incumbency, like the probability that the winning ﬁrm had already
been awarded in the past, or the number of times that the same ﬁrm had been awarded in the past.
10We deal with this problem by taking advantage of an electoral reform, approved on
March 27, 1993, which induced a variation in the potential time in oﬃce of a randomly
chosen group of mayors. As explained in Section 3, the reform introduced a two-term limit
for the mayor. Interestingly, the limit only applied to the terms elected after the reform,
determining two groups of mayors: those elected for the ﬁrst time before the reform (the
treatment group) could stay in oﬃce for at most three terms, as the ﬁrst term was not
included in the computation of the term limit, while those elected for the ﬁrst time after
the reform (the control group) for at most two terms. In Figure 3 we graphically illustrate
the potential eﬀect of the reform on these two groups. Here, the continuous lines denote
the ﬁrst term around the reform, while the shaded lines the potential additional terms
faced by each two group of mayors.
The institutional framework oﬀers a unique natural experiment, because the timing
of local elections is not completely synchronized neither between nor within regions (to a
certain degree, any city has its own scheduling, depending on region/province/city-speciﬁc
past events), which provides a source of heterogeneous variation across the country. For
our identiﬁcation strategy to hold, however, what really matters is that mayors could not
anticipate the introduction of the term limit, in which case we could treat the potential
time in oﬃce “as if randomly” assigned. Since the bill of the reform was ﬁrst submitted
to the national parliament on July 4, 1992, and ﬁnally approved on March 27, 1993, we
can conﬁdently assume that the reform was indeed unexpected. To rule out the possibility
that some mayors systematically resigned before the natural termination of the term to
take advantage of a potential extra term, we will further inspect the frequency distribution
of the election timing around March 1993, in search for any suspicious density jump.
As a by-product of the reform, Figure 3 also shows that some mayors happened to
face the term limit when in the second term, while others when in the third term. Thus,
comparing second term mayors with and without a term limit, and second term and third
term mayors with a term limit, will also allows to separate the eﬀect of the time in oﬃce
from the eﬀect of the lack of electoral accountability, which is instead a major empirical
issue in many other studies (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; Ferraz and Finan, 2010).19
Following the above discussion, we re-estimate equation (1) within a two-stage frame-
19The same argument applies in the estimation of equation (1).
11work. As an exclusion restriction in the ﬁrst-stage, we use an indicator for whether the
mayor was elected for the ﬁrst time before March 1993, and then add the full set of avail-
able regressors considered in the baseline speciﬁcation. The resulting ﬁrst-stage equation
looks as follows:
Tim = a + bPRm + c1Xi + c2Xm + eim (2)
where, because of the term invariant nature of the instrument, Tim is the number of terms
in oﬃce, and PRm indicates whether the date of the ﬁrst election was before March 27,
1993.20 This estimate is run over the sample of mayors elected for the ﬁrst time between
ﬁve years before and four years after the electoral reform (i.e., between March 27, 1988
and March 27, 1997, as the duration of the legislature before and after the reform was
4 and 5 years, respectively), to be sure that no one in the sample could be reelected for
a second term before the implementation of the reform. This procedure delivers a ﬁnal
sample of mayors in the second term (with or without a binding term limit) and in the
third term.
5.2 Multidimensionality of the Policy
One threat to our identiﬁcation strategy comes from the validity of the exclusion restric-
tion. The 1993 reform, in fact, also introduced other changes in the institutional setting
that might have had a direct eﬀect on the way public procurement auctions were ad-
ministered.21 In particular, the reform changed the mayor’s electoral rule from party to
individual ballot. This may have induced a diﬀerent selection of candidates, as the new
electoral system was more competitive and because citizens could choose their most fa-
vorite candidate without parties interfering.22 Although this is a major concern, it is worth
20Other estimation strategies could have been implemented. With repeated observations per mayor, over
terms and auctions, we could exploit the longitudinal structure of the data. Under the assumption that
unobserved collusion is time/auction invariant, and in presence of enough within-mayor variability, the
ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator is a powerful solution for the omission of any time/auction invariant characteristic,
like the propensity to collude. However, we decided not follow this strategy for two reasons. First, because
the assumption of time/auction invariance of collusion is not reasonable in our context, as unlawful
behaviors may grow with time in oﬃce. Second, because in our data the within-mayor variation in the
number of terms is much smaller than the between-mayor variation, which makes it diﬃcult to deliver
precise ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates.
21The reform also introduced a majority premium for the mayor’s coalition of at least two-thirds of the
seats in the council (see Section 3). This feature is not relevant for our analysis, except for the eﬀect on
the probability of early termination. We will discuss this point in Section 6.2.1.
22See Section 3 for more details.
12recognizing two things. First, this selection bias is minimum within the 2SLS sample, as at
2000-2005 all the mayors had gone through at least one individual ballot election. Second,
while the term limit applied sharply after the reform, the introduction of individual ballot
elections was instead more resilient, because of the initial diﬃculty for parties to recruit
suitable candidates for the new electoral system. If this is true, focusing on mayors elected
right before and right after the 1993 reform should remove the bias due to the diﬀerent
electoral rule for the treated and the control group.
Following a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach, we augment equa-
tion (1) and (2) with a function of the distance of the ﬁrst election from the discontinuity
threshold as follows:
yim = α + β1Tim + β2f(distm) + δ1Xi + δ2Xm + νim (3)
and,
Tim = a + b1PRm + b2g(distm) + c1Xi + c2Xm + eim (4)
where distm is the time distance of the ﬁrst election from the March 1993 reform, and f(.)
and g(.) are ﬂexible functions. Since the running variable is not continuous, as elections
are held at few points in time (see Figure 4), we specify f(.) and g(.) as a series of time
dummies. As discussed in Lee (2008), the fuzzy RDD framework also allows us to test for
the validity of the exogeneity assumption by comparing a set of pre-intervention charac-
teristics for the treated and the control group. If there were nonrandom selection around
the 1993 reform, we should expect some of these characteristics to diﬀer systematically.
6 Empirical Evidence
To begin with, in Figure 2 we plot the term average of six variables that characterize the
procurement process, for the case of a ﬁrst term mayor who is reelected for a second term,
and does not face a term limit. As for the amount of public works, we report the total
number of auctions per term and the starting value per auction. As for the auction out-
comes, we report the number of bidders, the winning rebate and the geographical identity
of the winner per auction, plus the highest percentage of auctions awarded to the same
13ﬁrm within the term.23 Looking at the ﬁgure, we do not detect any signiﬁcant variation
in the number and the size of the public works over terms, except for a slightly higher
number of auctions in the ﬁrst term. This is evidence that the amount of construction
works is independent from the electoral cycle, and simply follows the necessities of the
municipality.24 We ﬁnd instead some preliminary evidence that the time in oﬃce dete-
riorates the functioning of the auctions, with a clear drop in the number of bidders and
in the winning rebate when a mayor is elected for a second time, and a positive jump in
the probability that the winning ﬁrm is local and in the highest percentage of auctions
awarded to the same ﬁrm.25 We focus therefore the empirical analysis on the auction
outcomes (the number of bidders, the winning rebate, and the identity of the winner), and
treat the amount and the size of public works as if exogenously pre-determined.
6.1 OLS Estimates
In Table 4 and Table 5 we report the OLS results from ﬁtting equation (1) to the data.
Estimates in columns 1 and 4 are computed considering the exact longevity in oﬃce
(cumulated and consecutive) at the time of the bids’ delivery. We ﬁrst include only an
indicator for whether the term limit is binding or not, while in columns 2 and 5 we also
include the full set of observable characteristics discussed in Section 5. Finally, in columns
3 and 6 we report the same estimates, but replacing the number of years with the number
of terms in oﬃce.
In Panel A and B of Table 4 we report the estimates on the number of bidders and the
winning rebate (the level of competition). Estimates conﬁrm the presence of a negative
relationship between mayors’ longevity in oﬃce and the level of competition in the pro-
curement auctions. A one standard deviation increase in the years in oﬃce (3.24 years)
is associated with a decrease in the number of bidders by about 6.6% (with respect to a
sample mean of 21.33 bidders), and with a decrease in the winning rebate by 3.7% (with
23The total number of auctions and the highest percentage of auctions awarded to the same bidder are
computed on the mayoral terms elected between 1998 and 2003, to provide at least three observed years
per term.
24For example, the construction of public infrastructures is usually determined in advance in accordance
with the central government, which allocates the transfers.
25We ﬁnd similar ﬁgures for the case of a mayor reelected for a second term, but facing a term limit.
The only diﬀerence is that the drop in the number of bidders and in the winning rebate is less signiﬁcant.
14respect to a sample mean of 12.97%). Similarly, one additional term in oﬃce is associated
with a decrease in the number of bidders and in the winning rebate by about 10.1% and
5.7%, respectively. The invariance of the estimates with respect to the measurement unit
(years or terms) is also reassuring against the possibility that the diﬀerent duration of the
terms elected before and after September 2000 (4 and 5 years) could inﬂuence our results.
The coeﬃcient on the term limit is statistically signiﬁcant over the number of bidders,
showing a higher participation when a mayor is about to leave the oﬃce, but with no
consequences on the ﬁnal adjudication price. The estimated coeﬃcients on the resident
population are all positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero for both outcomes at 1%
level, suggesting remarkable size eﬀects: the bigger the market, the higher the number of
potential competitors. The coeﬃcient on the starting value is also positive and statistically
diﬀerent from zero for both outcomes, which is evidence that the bigger the size of the
public work, the greater the willingness of potential bidders to enter.26 We do not ﬁnd
instead any eﬀect of the mayor’s party longevity on both outcomes, which makes us think
that, because of the increased power of the mayor that followed the 1993 reform, political
parties might have become less important in the procurement assignment. We do not
ﬁnd any eﬀect also for the majority seats belonging to the mayor’s coalition, but some
positive eﬀect for the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition on the winning rebate,
which is statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level. The latter is evidence that a high level of
heterogeneity within the government coalition reduces the possibility of coordination in
shaping the auction process.
In Panel A and B of Table 5 we report the estimates on an indicator of whether the
winning ﬁrm is registered in the same region, and the highest percentage of auctions
awarded to the same ﬁrm within the term (the nature of competition). Even in this case
the eﬀect is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation
increase in the time in oﬃce is associated with an increase in the probability that the
winner is a local ﬁrm by about 2.2% (with respect to a sample mean of 70.46%), and
with an increase in the maximum percentage of auctions assigned to the same ﬁrm by
26Interestingly, the trend is reverted when the size of the work is too high (the square term, not reported,
is in fact negative and signiﬁcant), probably because of some production and ﬁnancial constraints. Note
also that the law shapes the admission requirements as a function of the starting value of the auctions
(increasing, concave, and discontinuous).
1510.3% (with respect to a sample mean of 24.41%).27 Similarly, one additional term in
oﬃce is associated with an increase in the probability that the winner is local by about
3.8% and 14.7%, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcient on the resident population is
positive for the ﬁrst outcome, but not for the second, while the coeﬃcient on the starting
value is always negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero for both outcomes, which
is compatible with the idea that the bigger the size of the public work, the highest the
monitoring exerted by the other agents (either citizens or competing ﬁrms). We also
ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the mayor’s party longevity on the
maximum percentage of auctions assigned to the same ﬁrm, but not on the probability
that the winner is local. The same is true for the majority seats belonging to the mayor’s
coalition, and for the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition, which are both negative
and statistically signiﬁcant.
6.2 2SLS Estimates
Although the OLS estimates included a large number of observable characteristics, it
could still be that the lack of competition induced by hidden collusive behaviors might
help politicians to be reelected, or that informed voters might punish collusive behaviors
by not granting reelection. This, of course, would severely bias the OLS estimates. To
take care of the potential reverse causality between Tim and yim, we present the results of
a 2SLS estimation, as explained in Section 5, where we use the shift in political longevity
induced by the March 1993 reform as an excluded instrument.
6.2.1 Validity Tests
Before presenting the 2SLS results, we argue on the quality of the instrument. We ﬁrst
report evidence that the election timing was independent from the reform by graphically
inspecting the distribution of elections around March 1993. Figure 4 plots on the horizontal
axis the time from January 1985 to December 2008, and on the vertical axis the frequency
27We run the same estimation on the probability that the winning ﬁrm is registered in the same
province/city. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively the same, although less statistically signiﬁcant.
We also included in all the estimates a quadratic term for the time in oﬃce to capture any eventual non-
linearity, but this was never statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, we excluded from the sample the auctions
with a restricted participation procedure (Trattativa Privata), and did not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in the
results.
16of elections (in light brown) and the frequency of early terminations for any political reason
(in green).28 Between 1985 and 2008 elections were held regularly, up to a certain degree
of asynchronism. Early terminations, however, were more frequent before March 1993,
because of the absence at that time of a majority premium for the winning coalition. To
check more carefully whether there is some mass distribution of early resignations around
March 1993, we focus the graphical inspection on a closer neighborhood of the reform, i.e.,
on the elections held between March 1992 and March 1994 only (see Figure 5). In this
interval there are a few anticipated elections (red full rectangles) and also a few delayed
elections (blue full rectangles). Most importantly, the majority of anticipated elections
did not serve the purpose of avoiding the reform (red empty rectangles), and few of the
mayors who postponed the election were then appointed for another term (blue empty
rectangles).
As discussed in Section 5, another potential threat to the validity of the 1993 reform
as an instrument comes from the multi-dimensionality of the reform itself, which also
introduced the individual ballot election of the mayor. If so, mayors elected before and
after the reform might diﬀer in their observable and unobservable characteristics because
of the diﬀerent selection process. However, if the eﬀect of the individual ballot elections
was somehow resilient, because of the initial diﬃculty for parties to recruit candidates
more suitable to the new electoral system, we should not observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between mayors elected right before and after the 1993 reform.
To address this point, in Table 6 we report the sample averages of mayors’ character-
istics by treatment status for the entire sample of mayors. We consider ﬁve diﬀerent time
windows, and test for the statistical diﬀerence of the following characteristics: gender, age,
whether born in the same region, whether employed at a low occupational level, whether
a college graduate, whether appointed before in any other municipal oﬃce, and the prob-
ability of being reelected for a second term.29 These variables should meet the following
28An early termination is any anticipated conclusion of the term for one of the following reasons: a)
the resignation of the mayor; or b) the resignation of the majority of the council or a no-conﬁdence vote
in the council. At 2008, we do not know whether the terms elected after 2002 terminated earlier. The
variable is therefore missing after 2002.
29We also compared a set of dummies for whether the mayor was born in the same province/region,
and for other levels of occupation/education, but results were qualitatively the same. Other city-level
characteristics, like the resident population or the geographical location, would not be balanced if the
election timing was to a certain degree coordinated, as it actually was, across regions. Accordingly, we
17two conditions: they should not be aﬀected by the electoral reform, but they may depend
on the same unobservable characteristics which are likely to aﬀect the auction mechanism.
Numbers in Panel A show that the diﬀerences for a one-year symmetric window (March
1992-March 1994) are never statistically diﬀerent from zero. The same is true when we
use a two-years symmetric window (Panel B). We do ﬁnd instead that within three/four
years after the reform there were systematically more females than within three/four years
before the reform (see Panel C and D), mayors were more educated, more experienced,
and had a higher reelection probability. In Panel E we present the same tests over the
largest asymmetric window (March 1988-March 1997) that we use in the estimation of
equation (4). As expected, almost all the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant, including
the occupational level.30 Numbers are consistent with the plots in Figure 6, where we
draw a running-mean smoothing of the observed values, performed separately on either
side of the 1993 reform.
Taken together, this evidence highlights a positive trend in the quality of the elected
mayors, rather than a sharp change after the reform. Accordingly, we specify f(.) and
g(.) in equation (4) as a set of year dummies, excluding the two years before and after the
March 1993 reform.
6.2.2 Results
Tables 7 and 8 report the 2SLS estimates on the number of bidders, the winning rebate,
the probability that the winning ﬁrm is local, and the maximum percentage of auctions
assigned to the same ﬁrm within the term, for the sample of mayors elected for the ﬁrst
time between ﬁve years before, and four years after the March 1993 reform.
The ﬁrst column in Table 7 reports the ﬁrst-stage estimate of the eﬀect of the reform
on the actual time in oﬃce. Mayors elected for the ﬁrst time before the reform accumulate,
on average, 0.978 terms more than mayors elected after the reform, with the ﬁrst-stage
F-statistic of the excluded instrument suggesting that the instrument is relevant.
include these two variables in all the speciﬁcations, together with all the other controls.
30A more accurate test would be to check the same characteristics over the sample of mayors that we use
in the 2SLS estimation. However, the small estimation sample size (198 mayors in the March 1992-March
1994 window, and 335 in the March 1991-March 1995) would not deliver precise statistics. We assume
therefore that, up to some small sample bias, if the balancing property is fulﬁlled over the whole sample
of mayors, it is also fulﬁlled over the estimation sample. See Section 6.2.3 for a more extensive discussion.
18In columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 we ﬁrst report the OLS estimates over the 2SLS sample,
to exclude any sample speciﬁc eﬀect, while in columns 3 and 5 we report the second-stage
estimates for the fully speciﬁed 2SLS model. We ﬁnd that one term more in oﬃce causes
a 21.74% decrease in the number of bidders (with respect to a sample mean of 19.70),
and a 12.36% reduction in the winning rebate (with respect to a sample mean of 11.68%).
In Table 8 we report evidence of the eﬀect of the time in oﬃce on the probability that
the winning ﬁrms is local, and for the maximum percentage of auctions assigned to the
same ﬁrm within the term. Estimated coeﬃcients in columns 2 and 4 are positive for both
outcomes, but not statistically diﬀerent from zero for the probability that the winning
ﬁrm is local. In particular, a one term increase in the time in oﬃce causes a 26.30%
increase in the maximum percentage of auctions assigned to the same ﬁrm within the
term (with respect to a sample mean of 24.37%). It is also interesting to note that the
2SLS estimates are systematically higher than the OLS estimates over the same sample,
both in Table 7 and in Table 8. According to the discussion in Section 5, this diﬀerence
should be interpreted as evidence that the less colluded mayors are more likely to gain
reelection, and therefore survive longer.31
6.2.3 Discussion
In this section we discuss three major concerns related to our ﬁndings.
First, as we only observe the mayors who were elected around 1993 and then sur-
vived until 2000-2005, this might introduce a sample selection bias in the estimates. In
particular, mayors elected before and after the reform may systematically diﬀer over two
dimensions. On the one hand, they may have a diﬀerent probability of ﬁrst reelection:
we show in Table 6 that both treated and control mayors have about 80% probability of
being elected for a second term. On the other hand, mayors elected before the reform may
be further selected in the second reelection round: we ﬁnd that, within the estimation
sample, all the second term mayors without a term limit were then reelected for a third
term. These probabilities are also compatible with the ﬁrst-stage estimate of the eﬀect of
the reform on the actual number of terms in oﬃce (0.988, see column 1 in Table 7), which,
31We estimated the same 2SLS model on a sample including the mayors elected for the second, third
and fourth time within ﬁve years before the 1993 reform, to gain in sample size (9,277 auctions instead
of 8,801). Results were quantitatively and qualitatively the same.
19if there was a sample selection bias, should be signiﬁcantly lower than 1.
Second, we discuss the possibility that our ﬁnding on the winning rebate might reﬂect
an improvement in the quality of the public works, rather than a reduction in the competi-
tive pressure within the auctions. To rule out this diﬀerent interpretation, we repeated our
exercise using the data set of Bandiera et al. (2009), which contains detailed information
about the quantity and the quality of a set of standardized goods and services purchased
by a random sample of 68 Italian municipalities over the period 2000-2005. Despite sam-
ple size limitations, we ﬁnd that the price for an average good, conditional on its quality,
increases by about 16% at each additional term in oﬃce.32 We take this evidence as a
falsiﬁcation exercise on an external sample where quality is a minor issue.
Finally, at the time of ﬁrst election mayors appointed before the 1993 reform had
potentially an inﬁnite political horizon, while those elected after the reform could stay
in oﬃce for at most two terms. While this diﬀerence had no impact on their ex-post
incentives, because at 2000-2005 they all knew about the term-limit, it might still be the
case that the diﬀerent career perspectives at the time of ﬁrst election had aﬀected their
ex-ante decision to run for a mayoral oﬃce. Political careers, however, are not limited to
the municipality oﬃce. We observe, indeed, that 14% of the mayors with a term limit
at 2000-2005 later continued their career at higher oﬃces (province, region, or national
parliament). In particular, we do not ﬁnd any statistical diﬀerence on this probability
between mayors elected before and after the reform, which corroborates the assumption
that they actually had similar political horizons.
7 Theoretical Model
In this section we develop a model to rationalize the empirical results, and argue that
time in oﬃce is associated with higher political collusion. The model highlights two key
characteristics of public procurement auctions: the possibility for politicians and bidders
to exchange favors; and the repeated nature over time of this interaction. The model builds
on the results from the literature on favoritism in procurement auctions (Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum, 2009; Burguet and Perry, 2009) and on repeated auctions (Skrzypacz
32We excluded the purchases made through the central purchasing authority (CONSIP).
20and Hopenhayn, 2004), to show that time in oﬃce helps politicians to build collusive
relationships with bidders.
Figure 7 describes the time-line of the model for a generic period/auction t. Collusion
takes place in a sequence of two hypothetical stages, over inﬁnitely many periods/auctions.
In the ﬁrst stage, a new mayor starts searching for one bidder. The mayor, in exchange
for a bribe, commits to reveal the distribution of the bids to the favored bidder. In the
second stage, the favored bidder can adjust his original bid, if the highest bid was lower
than his own private valuation, and win. A long-lived relationship happens if the mayor
is matched with a collusive bidder; otherwise in the next period/auction he searches for
another bidder.
In what follows we illustrate the structure of the model focusing on one generic sub-
game, a snap-shot of the inﬁnite game, and solve it backward. We then present the
predictions of the model, and discuss its assumptions.
7.1 Stage 2: Procurement Auctions with Collusion
At any point in time (t), for t = (1,2,...), a mayor is delegated by the principal (the
citizens) to run one sealed-bid single-object auction, of ﬁrst-price type.33 In each auction
there are Nt bidders, and entry is costless. At the beginning of each Stage 2, bidders’
valuations of the good νi are identically and independently drawn from the c.d.f. F(ν),
with support over the interval [ν,ν] within the independent private value framework. F(ν)
is assumed log concave, hence the ratio α(νi) =
F(νi)
f(νi) is increasing. Both the bidders and
the auctioneer are risk neutral. There is no reserve price, and the bidder with the highest
bid is awarded the auction.
The core of this setup is the information structure. We denote by h(t) the public
history of the game. Every period/auction the Nt−1 bidders learn t, the longevity of the
mayor, and π, the proportion of collusive bidders in the population. This information is
publicly known, and can be used by the bidders to derive P t = 1 − (1 − π)t, which is
the probability that the mayor has found a collusive bidder after t independent trials. By
construction, this probability is increasing in t. To avoid both explicit and tacit collusion
33From now on, we will refer to a generic ascending auction, which is equivalent in its functioning to a
descending procurement auction.
21between bidders, we assume that bidders do not communicate and that the identity of the
winner is not immediately observed (Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn, 2004). We also restrict
the attention to equilibria where players’ bids depend only on their current valuation and
the public history of the game.34
Given this set of assumptions, the stage proceeds as follows. The colluded bidder
(denoted by c) observes the highest bid bh, and may opt to adjust his original bid and set
bc = bh + ε if this is lower than vc. The Nt − 1 non-colluded bidders are symmetric, and
know about the colluded bidder only through Pt. Bidding is guaranteed by the fact that
some of the Nt − 1 bidders in any auction may evaluate the good more than the colluded
bidder.
Assuming that the expected continuation payoﬀs for the non-collusive bidders are the
same as in a one-shot game, we describe the per-period bidding behavior of the Nt −
1 non-colluded bidders, the per-period expected revenues of the auction, and the per-
period coalition’s expected utility. A non-favored bidder solves his maximization problem





(N−2)F(b) + (1 − Pt)(F(φ
p(b))
(N−1)] (5)
where, in square brackets, there is the probability that a non-favored bidder i wins the
auction by bidding b, F(·)(N−2) is the probability that a non-favored bidder defeats the
N − 2 honest rivals, and F(b) is the probability of defeating the favored bidder.
We take the F.O.C.’s of equation (5), and consider a symmetric equilibrium where
νi = φp(b), and the following diﬀerential equation characterizes the per-period inverse
bidding function φp(b) with strictly increasing solution:
(φp(b) − b) =
[Pt(F(φp(b))F(b) + (1 − Pt)(F(φp(b))2]
Pt[(n − 2)F(φp(b)f (φp(b)(φp′(b)) + F(φp(b))f (φp(b)] + (1 − Pt)(N − 1)F(φp(b)f (φp(b)φp′(b)
(6)
As in Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009), if α(ν) =
F(ν)
f(ν) is strictly concave, an
increase in Pt implies that φPt(b) < φPt+1(b) for all b > ν, with 0 ≤ Pt < Pt+1 ≤ 1.35
It follows that a higher probability of collusion induces non-favored bidders to bid less
34This set of assumptions is equivalent to assuming that at every auction there is a new set of bidders,
for example because they rotate across municipalities.
35See Proposition 3, pg. 651.
22aggressively, it increases the coalition’s expected utility (V b
c > Vfp > 0, where V b
c and Vfp
are the expected revenues from collusion and from a standard ﬁrst price auction), and it
decreases the expected proﬁt of a non-favored bidder and the expected revenues from the
auction. We use these results in the collusion stage.
7.2 Stage 1: Collusion/Search Game
Collusion happens in a framework where a mayor is searching for a collusive bidder, and
there are gains from collusion. We ﬁrst illustrate the mayor’s search problem, taking
the bidder’s action as exogenous. We show that the optimal search strategy is to stop
searching if and only if the mayor meets a collusive bidder.
At the beginning of period t, the mayor is randomly matched with one of the Nt bidders.
The mayor may reveal the distribution of the bids, or just the highest bid, in exchange
for a bribe B.36 The mayor has no costs of revealing the information, and can test only
one bidder per-auction. With probability π he is matched with a collusive bidder, i.e., a
bidder who is willing to pay a bribe; otherwise he is matched with a non-collusive bidder,
in which case B = 0.37 In this simpliﬁed setup, the mayor’s per-period expected revenues
from collusion are strictly positive and larger than the revenues from non collusion, as
V m
c = πB + (1 − π)0 > V m
nc = 0. Hence, for the mayor it is always optimal to collude.
In case of a zero bribe, at the beginning of period t + 1 the mayor searches for another
bidder.
The bidder’s decision problem is to choose whether to pay or not the bribe, which
depends on the cost of colluding Cj. There are two types of bidders: collusive (Cj = CL)
and not collusive (Cj = CH), with CH > CL. If the bidder is of a collusive type then
Bj = B, otherwise Bj = 0. We denote with V b
c > V b
fp > 0 the expected revenues from
collusion and from a standard ﬁrst price auction, respectively. If the matched bidder is
collusive, he can aﬀord B, every period he gets V b
c − B > Vfp > 0, and collusion is the
unique strictly dominant strategy. If the matched bidder is non-collusive, he cannot aﬀord
B, every period he gets Vfp > (V − B) < 0, and non-collusion is the unique strictly
36Without loss of generality, we assume that the entire bargaining power over the coalition’s surplus is
owned by the collusive bidder.
37The agreement is reached in Stage 1, but the transfer takes place in Stage 2, once the mayor observes
the distribution of the bids. This game can be viewed as a commitment game where the mayor punishes
a zero bribe by splitting the relationship.
23dominant strategy.
7.3 Predictions
A public perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium is deﬁned by the mayor optimization, the favored
bidder optimization, the non-favored bidders optimization, and the commonly known prob-
ability of collusion Pt. As long as P t is increasing in t, one potential equilibrium of the
model is characterized by a gradual diﬀusion of collusion over time/auctions (Pt+1 > Pt),
where in each following period/auction the non-colluded bidders learn the probability that
the mayor has found a colluded bidder, and behave accordingly. The model delivers the
following testable predictions:
Prediction 1 As mayor’s longevity increases, the probability that auctions are assigned
to the same bidder increases (Pt+1 > Pt).
Prediction 2 As mayor’s longevity increases, non-favored bidders bid less aggressively.
Prediction 3 As mayor’s longevity increases, the revenues of the auction decrease.
7.4 Discussion
To leave the exposition as simpler as possible, the model was built under the assumption
that procurement auctions are of a ﬁrst-price type. Closer to the institutional setting
regulating public procurement auctions in Italy, we should consider the case, instead,
where the winner of the auction is the one who bids the highest value below the averaged-
average.38 However, as long as the bidders still have to guess a ﬁrst moment of the bids’
distribution, their bid will be higher than their valuation. If so, it is worthy for the mayor
to communicate to the colluded bidder this particular moment of the bids’ distribution,
and for the colluded bidder to pay the bribe and adjust the bid.39
We also assumed that time was inﬁnite, and mayors and bidders could interact for
inﬁnitely periods/auctions. In the presence of a term limit, as in the Italian case, this
assumption might be unrealistic. However, as we have shown in Section 6.2.3, mayors
38The averaged-average is the sum of the average of the bids and the average computed with the upper
deviations from the average. In Section 3 we discuss the details of the procurement mechanism in Italy.
39In the collusion game at Stage 1, we also assumed that there is no competition between bidders in
bribing the mayors, as in Compte et al. (2005).
24actually face a continuation game, as there is a signiﬁcant fraction of them who is later
appointed at higher oﬃces. Hence, if the payoﬀs in the continuation game are large enough,
collusion is still an equilibrium even when the continuation probability is small (Mailath
and Samuelson, 2006).40
Another aspect we neglected in the previous analysis is the presence of entry costs. As
in Menezes and Monteiro (2000), non-favored bidders enter up to the point where their
expected proﬁt is larger than the entry cost k, with k > 0. Since Pt+1 > Pt, the entry
threshold increases with t, thus reducing the participation of less eﬃcient (and non-favored)
bidders. At any period/auction t there will be some non-favored bidders with negative
expected proﬁts. When entry is costly, the model delivers another testable prediction:
Prediction 4 As mayor’s longevity increases, the number of bidders per auction de-
creases.
We enrich the predictions of the model arguing that local bidders might have lower costs
of bribing (or lower entry costs), and then ﬁnd easier to pay the bribe to the mayor. Since
types are not perfectly observed before the ﬁrst interaction, the model delivers another
testable prediction:
Prediction 5 As mayor’s longevity increases, the probability that the winner is local in-
creases.
Finally, a more sophisticated model should consider the role of citizens/voters (the
principal) in disciplining mayors (the agent) granting or not reelection. This would clearly
enrich the dynamics of the model and the number of testable predictions, at the price
of complicating the analysis of collusive dynamics. We leave this extension to further
research, while addressing its empirical implications in Section 5. There, we discussed
how the interaction between mayors and voters could bias our empirical analysis, and how
our identiﬁcation strategy could help us to take voters’ behavior as exogenous.
40Using the available procurement data, we ﬁnd that projects are larger at provincial level (an average
starting value of 650.000 euros).
258 Conclusions
In this paper we used a matched mayor-auction data set to provide novel empirical evidence
on the extent to which politicians can inﬂuence public procurement. Our main result is
that, when politicians stay in power for too long, there is a systematic deterioration in the
functioning of the auction mechanism, as we observe less participation, a higher cost of the
public work, and an increase in the probability that the winner is an insider. This eﬀect
persists even after controlling for a large set of mayor, city, and electoral characteristics,
as well as for the endogeneity of time in oﬃce using an instrumental variable approach.
With the aid of a stylized theoretical model of favoritism in repeated procurement
auctions, we interpret these ﬁgures as evidence that, when a mayor stays in power for
longer, there is a higher probability of collusion. In fact, the decline in the winning rebate
suggests that it is not the most eﬃcient bidder who is awarded a higher number of auctions,
but that non-favored ﬁrms start bidding less aggressively, as every period they update the
probability that there might be a favored bidder. For the same reason, the number of
bidders decreases, as non-favored bidders will soon opt out and save on the entry cost,
while favored bidders will be awarded a higher percentage of auctions. Lastly, under the
assumption of lower entry costs (or lower costs of bribing) for local ﬁrms, they also collude
with a higher probability, although this prediction receives less support in the data.
From the point of view of a regulator interested in rationalizing public spending, our
ﬁndings encourage the implementation of policies favoring political turnover (for example,
through the introduction of a term limit), such that political collusion could be eliminated
and competition in public procurement restored. As far as the functioning of procurement
auctions is sensitive to the repeated interaction between politicians and local bidders, our
ﬁndings also suggest the introduction of policies aimed at limiting the power of politicians
over the auction mechanism (for example, through the institution of a central purchasing
authority).
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28Tables and Figures
Table 1: City characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
North-West 0.40 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
North-East 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
Center 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1
South 0.22 0.41 0 0 0 0 1
Islands 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Population 11,668 63,363 504 1,807 3,845 8,412 2,733,908
N. cities: 3,825
Notes. Cities with at least one auction between 2000-2005, and with a population greater
than 500. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the ﬁrst
observed term.
29Table 2: Mayor/Term characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Female 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
Age 49.88 9.15 25.30 43.40 49.62 55.82 84.28
Born in the city 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Born in the province 0.85 0.36 0 1 1 1 1
Born in the region 0.94 0.24 0 1 1 1 1
Education:
Secondary 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
College 0.47 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Employment:
Not employed 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1
Low-skilled 0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 1
Medium-skilled 0.09 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
High-skilled 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 1 1
Political party:
Center-right 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1
Center 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 0 1
Center-left 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
Separatist 0.01 0.09 0 0 0 0 1
Others 0.54 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Political experience:
Previous experience 0.62 0.49 0 0 1 1 1
Years in oﬃce (as mayor) 2.30 3.24 0 0 0 4.14 14.97
Term in oﬃce (as mayor) = 1 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 1 3
Term in oﬃce (as mayor) = 2 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 1 3
Term in oﬃce (as mayor) = 3 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 1 3
Term in oﬃce (as mayor) = 4 0.02 0.17 0 0 0 1 3
Term limit binding 0.39 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
Party longevity (years) 1.77 2.63 0 0 0 4.14 15.78
Party longevity (terms) 0.41 0.60 0 0 0 1 4
Mayor’s coalition:
N. parties mayor’s coalition 1.31 0.99 1 1 1 1 12
Seats mayor’s coalition (%) 67.79 7.52 60 66.67 66.67 66.67 100
N. seats above majority 2.89 1.08 1 2 3 3 14
N. terms: 5,209
Notes. Mayors with no early terminations in the past. Secondary includes both lower and upper secondary
education. Low-skilled includes blue-collars, Medium-skilled clerks, and High-skilled entrepreneurs and self-
employed. Previous experience is a dummy for whether the mayor was in the council or in the executive
committee before. Years/terms in oﬃce (as mayor) without interruption. Term limit binding is a dummy for
whether the mayor cannot be reelected. Party Longevity is the longevity of the mayor’s party in years/terms.
N. parties mayors’ coalition is the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition. N. seats above majority is the
number of seats for the mayor’s coalition above the absolute majority.
30Table 3: Auction characteristics
Mean St.Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Outcome:
Number of bidders 21.34 21.12 1 5 14 31 100
Winning rebate (in %) 12.97 8.39 0 6.90 12.42 17.10 49.99
Winner in the city 0.12 0.33 0 0 0 0 1
Winner in the province 0.52 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Winner in the region 0.70 0.46 0 0 1 1 1
Max (%) same ﬁrm 0.24 0.25 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.33 1
Selection mechanism:
Direct negotiation 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
Characteristics of the good:
Starting value 5.40 9.35 1.34 2.03 2.94 5.16 190.83
Road 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1
School 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1
Building 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Housing 0.01 0.11 0 0 0 0 1
Art 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
Others 0.54 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Year bid delivery:
2000 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
2001 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
2002 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1
2003 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
2004 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
2005 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
N. auctions: 27,537
Notes. Auctions for works with starting value greater or equal than 150,000 euros, and no more than
100 bidders. Winner in the city/province/region is a dummy for whether the winning ﬁrm is registered
in the same city/province/region. Max % wins same ﬁrm is the highest percentage of auctions assigned
to the same ﬁrm within the term, and is term invariant. Direct negotiation is a dummy for the
selection mechanism being a Trattativa privata. Starting value is the reserve price set by the contracting
authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents).
31Table 4: Time in oﬃce and the level of competition, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean outcome: A: N. bidders = 21.33 B: Winning rebate = 12.97%
N. years in oﬃce -1.111*** -0.434*** -0.409*** -0.148***
(0.133) (0.116) (0.063) (0.045)
N. terms in oﬃce -2.153*** -0.741***
(0.538) (0.218)
Term limit binding 5.199*** 2.354*** 2.702*** 0.284 0.137 0.261
(1.386) (0.889) (0.927) (0.651) (0.378) (0.407)
Population 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.014) (0.014)
Starting value 0.685*** 0.685*** 0.086*** 0.087***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.011) (0.011)
Party longevity (terms) -0.373 -0.375 -0.351 -0.351
(0.470) (0.471) (0.213) (0.214)
N. parties mayor’s coalition 0.293 0.295 0.160* 0.160*
(0.187) (0.187) (0.095) (0.095)
N. seats above majority -0.262 -0.269 0.006 0.004
(0.191) (0.191) (0.087) (0.088)
Female -0.038 -0.028 -0.085 -0.081
(0.817) (0.817) (0.295) (0.295)
Age 0.010 0.010 0.023* 0.023*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013)
N. auctions 27,537 27,537 27,537 27,537 27,537 27,537
R-squared 0.008 0.215 0.215 0.015 0.444 0.444
Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes
City characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Auction characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Mayor characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Electoral characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 4,787 mayors (5,209 terms). N. bidders is the number of ﬁrms that submitted a bid. Winning Rebate
is expressed as a percentage discount from the the starting value. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor
cannot be reelected. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Starting
value is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Party Longevity (terms) is
the longevity of the mayor’s party in terms. N. parties mayors’ coalition is the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition.
N. seats above majority is the number of seats for the mayor’s coalition above the absolute majority. When denoted with
“yes”, regressions additionally include Region ﬁxed eﬀects (19 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid
delivery; City characteristics (disposable income per capita in 2005; judicial eﬃciency at year-region level; budget deﬁcit in
percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the starting value, 5 object characteristics
dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a
dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election,
2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral
characteristics as at the beginning of the term. Standard errors robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
32Table 5: Time in oﬃce and the nature of competition, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean outcome: A: Winner local = 70.46 B: Max % wins same ﬁrm = 24.41%
N. years in oﬃce 1.442*** 0.486** 1.967*** 0.777***
(0.188) (0.200) (0.287) (0.287)
N. terms in oﬃce 2.652*** 3.581***
(0.960) (1.384)
Term limit binding -7.100*** -1.846 -2.503 -6.947*** -2.201 -2.552
(1.457) (1.478) (1.555) (2.156) (1.665) (1.821)
Population 0.070*** 0.070*** -0.024 -0.024
(0.025) (0.025) (0.037) (0.037)
Starting Value -0.978*** -0.979*** -0.099*** -0.100***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.028) (0.028)
Party longevity (terms) 1.124 1.118 2.128** 2.130**
(0.855) (0.856) (0.830) (0.832)
N. parties mayor’s coalition 0.470 0.469 -1.273*** -1.276***
(0.352) (0.351) (0.287) (0.288)
N. seats above majority -0.383 -0.374 -1.350*** -1.345***
(0.461) (0.460) (0.381) (0.382)
Female 0.355 0.349 -1.087 -1.103
(1.476) (1.475) (1.355) (1.355)
Age 0.042 0.041 -0.064 -0.063
(0.068) (0.068) (0.052) (0.052)
N. auctions 27,537 27,537 27,537 23,110 23,110 23,110
R-squared 0.003 0.080 0.080 0.026 0.299 0.299
Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes
City characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Auction characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Mayor characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Electoral characteristics no yes yes no yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 4,787 mayors (5,209 terms) for Winner local. Estimates on 3,725 mayors (4,322 terms) for Max %
wins same ﬁrm (terms elected between 1998 and 2003). Winner local indicates whether the winning ﬁrm is registered in
the same region. Max % wins same ﬁrm is the highest percentage of auctions assigned to the same ﬁrm within the term,
and is term invariant. Term limit binding is a dummy for whether the mayor cannot be reelected. Population is the number
of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term, in 10,000. Starting value is the reserve price set by the contracting
authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Party Longevity (terms) is the longevity of the mayor’s party in terms. N.
parties mayors’ coalition is the number of parties in the mayor’s coalition. N. seats above majority is the number of seats for
the mayor’s coalition above the absolute majority. When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Region ﬁxed
eﬀects (19 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004) refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (disposable income
per capita in 2005; judicial eﬃciency at year-region level; budget deﬁcit in percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction
characteristics (squared term of the starting value, 5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor
characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral
characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous
experience in council or executive committee). All mayoral and electoral characteristics as at the beginning of the term.
Standard errors robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at
the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
33Table 6: Mayors’ characteristics around the March 1993 reform
Elected before March 1993 Elected after March 1993
Mean Mean p-value diﬀ.
A: −12/ + 12 months bandwidth
Female 0.065 0.063 0.703
Age 44.396 43.920 0.541
Local 0.947 0.947 0.967
Empl. low-skilled 0.822 0.830 0.814
Edu. college 0.544 0.541 0.934
Previous experience 0.444 0.430 0.727
Probability of ﬁrst reelection 0.831 0.780 0.338
N. mayors 65 772
B: −24/ + 24 months bandwidth
Female 0.063 0.066 0.818
Age 44.824 44.119 0.271
Local 0.953 0.941 0.425
Empl. low-skilled 0.813 0.820 0.756
Edu. college 0.496 0.550 0.106
Previous experience 0.398 0.424 0.433
Probability of ﬁrst reelection 0.736 0.775 0.398
N. mayors 91 1,164
C: −36/ + 36 months bandwidth
Female 0.044 0.080 0.000
Age 44.328 44.379 0.798
Local 0.940 0.936 0.379
Empl. low-skilled 0.780 0.780 0.981
Edu. college 0.375 0.442 0.000
Previous experience 0.344 0.525 0.000
Probability of ﬁrst reelection 0.789 0.807 0.137
N. mayors 1,479 3,623
D: −48/+ 48 months bandwidth
Female 0.043 0.080 0.000
Age 44.372 44.397 0.901
Local 0.940 0.937 0.506
Empl. low-skilled 0.780 0.780 0.934
Edu. college 0.380 0.443 0.000
Previous experience 0.328 0.527 0.000
Probability of ﬁrst reelection 0.785 0.805 0.089
N. mayors 1,543 3,782
E: −60/ + 48 months bandwidth
Female 0.040 0.080 0.000
Age 44.657 44.397 0.155
Local 0.944 0.937 0.108
Empl. low-skilled 0.756 0.780 0.003
Edu. college 0.383 0.443 0.000
Previous experience 0.253 0.527 0.000
Probability of ﬁrst reelection 0.773 0.805 0.003
N. mayors 1,992 3,782
Notes. All mayors at ﬁrst election. Empl. low-skilled includes blue-collars. Local is a dummy for being born in the same
region. Probability of ﬁrst reelection is a dummy for whether the mayor was then reelected for a second term. Previous
experience is a dummy for whether the mayor was in the council or the executive committee before.
34Table 7: Time in oﬃce and the level of competition, fuzzy-RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Longevity N. N. Winning Winning
bidders bidders rebate rebate
Method: OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Stage: First Second Second
Mean outcome: 2.07 19.70 19.70 11.68% 11.68%
N. terms in oﬃce -2.604*** -4.284*** -0.530 -1.444***
(0.876) (1.381) (0.324) (0.441)
Elected before March 1993 0.988***
(0.009)
Term limit binding 0.832*** -0.241 1.052 -0.760 0.077
(0.049) (1.976) (2.211) (0.749) (0.824)
Population 0.000 0.094* 0.091* 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.049) (0.047) (0.005) (0.004)
Starting value 0.000 0.796*** 0.795*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.000) (0.092) (0.092) (0.023) (0.022)
Party longevity (terms) 0.018*** -1.089 -0.778 -0.320 -0.204
(0.005) (0.788) (0.752) (0.245) (0.241)
N. parties mayor’s coalition 0.002* 0.084 0.139 0.364*** 0.381***
(0.001) (0.284) (0.275) (0.098) (0.098)
N. seats above majority -0.002 0.197 0.148 0.031 0.018
(0.002) (0.293) (0.288) (0.119) (0.119)
Female -0.009** 2.000 1.957 -0.089 -0.099
(0.005) (1.379) (1.318) (0.526) (0.528)
Age -0.001*** 0.090* 0.085* 0.033** 0.032**
(0.000) (0.047) (0.046) (0.015) (0.015)
N. auctions 8,801 8,801 8,801 8,801 8,801
R-squared 0.939 0.234 0.236 0.426 0.428
F-exc.-Inst 12,403
Region ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 1,627 mayors (1,668 terms). In the interval [-24,+24], 2,012 auctions and 335 mayors. Mayors in the
third (treated) or second (control) term, elected for the ﬁrst time between March 27, 1988 and March 27, 1997, [-60,+48]
months around the electoral reform. Winner local is a dummy for whether the winning ﬁrm is registered in same the region.
Max % wins same ﬁrm is the highest percentage of auctions assigned to the same ﬁrm within the term. Elected before March
1993 is a dummy for whether the mayor was elected for the ﬁrst time before March 27, 1993. Term limit binding is a dummy
for whether the mayor cannot be reelected. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term,
in 10,000. Starting value is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Party
Longevity (terms) is the longevity of the mayor’s party in terms. N. parties mayors’ coalition is the number of parties in
the mayor’s coalition. N. seats above majority is the number of seats for the mayor’s coalition above the absolute majority.
When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Region ﬁxed eﬀects (19 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004)
refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (disposable income per capita in 2005; judicial eﬃciency at year-region
level; budget deﬁcit in percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the starting value,
5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous
occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year
before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee).
All mayoral and electoral characteristics as at the beginning of the term. Standard errors robust to clustering at the mayor
level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
35Table 8: Time in oﬃce and the nature of competition, fuzzy-RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Winner Winner Max % Max % wins
local local same ﬁrm same ﬁrm
Method: OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Mean outcome: 70.61 70.61 24.37 24.37
N. terms in oﬃce 2.366 1.909 1.964 6.410**
(1.761) (2.695) (2.169) (2.525)
Term limit binding 6.882 4.756 -6.446 -6.580
(4.586) (4.975) (9.445) (9.444)
Population 0.087*** 0.083*** -0.851*** -0.892***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.131) (0.121)
Starting value -0.996*** -0.998*** -0.106** -0.101**
(0.127) (0.126) (0.045) (0.045)
Party longevity (terms) 2.297* 2.410* 2.308* 1.934
(1.351) (1.342) (1.359) (1.337)
N. parties mayor’s coalition -0.216 -0.214 -1.909*** -1.933***
(0.631) (0.630) (0.494) (0.463)
N. seats above majority -0.091 -0.119 -0.061 0.107
(0.816) (0.807) (0.583) (0.560)
Female 4.978** 4.766** -1.710 -1.660
(1.968) (1.988) (1.860) (1.911)
Age 0.084 0.079 -0.089 -0.085
(0.090) (0.090) (0.075) (0.075)
N. auctions 8,801 8,801 7,616 7,616
R-squared 0.093 0.093 0.331 0.339
Region ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
City characteristics yes yes yes yes
Auction characteristics yes yes yes yes
Mayor characteristics yes yes yes yes
Electoral characteristics yes yes yes yes
Notes. Estimates on 1,627 mayors (1,668 terms) for Winner local, and on 1,353 mayors (1,349 terms) for Max % wins same
ﬁrm (terms elected between 1998 and 2003). In the interval [-24,+24], 2,012 auctions and 335 mayors for Winner local, and
1,081 auctions and 143 mayors for Max % wins same ﬁrm. Mayors in the third (treated) or second (control) term, elected
for the ﬁrst time between March 27, 1988 and March 27, 1997, [-60,+48] months around the electoral reform. Winner local
is a dummy for whether the winning ﬁrm is registered in the same region. Max % wins same ﬁrm is the highest percentage
of public tenders assigned to the same ﬁrm within the term, and is term invariant. Term limit binding is a dummy for
whether the mayor cannot be reelected. Population is the number of resident inhabitants at the beginning of the term,
in 10,000. Starting value is the reserve price set by the contracting authority, in 100,000 euros (2000 equivalents). Party
Longevity (terms) is the longevity of the mayor’s party in terms. N. parties mayors’ coalition is the number of parties in
the mayor’s coalition. N. seats above majority is the number of seats for the mayor’s coalition above the absolute majority.
When denoted with “yes”, regressions additionally include Region ﬁxed eﬀects (19 dummies); Year dummies (2000-2004)
refer to the year of bid delivery; City characteristics (disposable income per capita in 2005; judicial eﬃciency at year-region
level; budget deﬁcit in percentage of the revenues at year level); Auction characteristics (squared term of the starting value,
5 object characteristics dummies, 1 selection mechanism dummy); Mayor characteristics (2 education dummies, 3 previous
occupation dummies, a dummy for being born in the region); Electoral characteristics (a dummy for being in the last year
before the next election, 2 political party dummies, a dummy for previous experience in council or executive committee). All
mayoral and electoral characteristics as at the beginning of the term. First-stage estimates reported in Table 7. Standard
errors robust to clustering at the mayor level in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
36Figure 1: The awarding mechanism
Notes. Ravg is the average rebate, expressed as a percentage reduction form the starting value. T,
is the anomaly threshold obtained as the sum of Ravg and the average deviation of the bids above
Ravg. Rwin is the winning rebate that minimizes the distance from below T.















































































































Max % wins same firm
Notes. All variables averaged over the cities, by term. Pooled sample of all mayors who are then reelected for a second
term, without a term limit. Total auctions per term and Max % wins same ﬁrm on terms elected between 1998 and 2003
only. Total auctions per term is the total number of auctions. Starting value per auctions is the reserve price of the auction
expressed in 100 thousand euros (2000 equivalents). Bidders per auction is the number of bidding ﬁrms per auction. Winning
rebate per auction is the winning rebate expressed as a percentage discount from the starting value. Winner local is a dummy
for whether the winning ﬁrm is registered in the same region. Max % wins same ﬁrm is the highest percentage of public
tenders assigned to the same ﬁrm within the term.
38Figure 3: The 1993 electoral reform
Notes. TL means that the term limit is binding. Dash lines for potential following terms.



































jan−85 sep−87 sep−89 sep−91 mar−93 sep−95 sep−97 jan−00 sep−01 sep−03 dec−05 dec−08
election month
all early termination
Notes. The blue vertical line denotes the time of the electoral reform. Between red lines: the
period over which we have auction data. Early termination before the beginning of the last year
in oﬃce because of: mayor’s resignation, vote of no conﬁdence by 50% of either the council or the
executive committee. Early termination computed on terms elected before 2003 only, otherwise
right censored.





















anticipate and reelected delay
delay and reelected
Notes. The blue vertical line denotes the time of the electoral reform.
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distance from March 1993 (months)
post−reform pre−reform
Notes. The blue vertical line denotes the electoral reform. The solid line is a running-mean smoothing of the variable on
the vertical axis (with a bandwidth of 12 months), performed separately on either side of the electoral reform. High-skilled
includes entrepreneurs and self-employed. Local is a dummy for being born in the region. Probability of ﬁrst reelection is a
dummy for whether the mayor was elected for a second term. Previous experience is and indicator for whether the mayor
was in the council or the executive committee before. Reelected is an indicator for whether the mayor was reelected for a
second term (unconditional on recandidacy).
41Figure 7: The time-line of the model
Notes. π is the propoprtion of colluded bidders in the population. νi is the individual evaluation.
42